Frances Coulson
- Partner
- Insolvency & Restructuring
Matthews v BSN (SW) Property Ltd & Anor
The issue before the Court of Appeal in Matthews v BSN (SW) Property Ltd & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 1442, a second appeal in bankruptcy, was whether the creditor’s claim under a guarantee gave rise to a debt capable of founding a bankruptcy petition.
BSN (SW) Property Ltd and Oak First Investments Ltd had jointly petitioned for Mr Matthews’ bankruptcy relying on statutory demands based on a guarantee which he had given of the obligations of Chip Shack Ltd and Crab Shack Restaurants Ltd. (Only the former was relevant to the appeal.) The petition was initially heard by DJ Wales, who made a bankruptcy order.
Mr Matthews appealed. The appeal was heard by HHJ Paul Matthews, sitting as a High Court judge. One of the points argued on the appeal (there was substantial argument about the procedure leading to the making of the bankruptcy order) was whether the claim under the guarantee gave rise to a petitionable debt. The judge held that it did and dismissed the appeal. Mr Matthews’ second appeal came before the Court of Appeal following the granting of permission by Zacaroli LJ.
Mr Matthews did not appear to prosecute his appeal: on the day before the hearing he emailed the court saying that he could not afford legal representation, did not feel up to tackling the appeal himself, and, although he stood by his belief that the bankruptcy order made against him was unjust, he had no option but to withdraw it. That gave rise to the question whether the appeal should go ahead or be dismissed. Nugee LJ pointed out that withdrawal of an appeal required the agreement of the court: whilst CPR Part 38 gave a claimant the right, as a general rule (there were limited exceptions), to discontinue all or part of a claim at any time without the permission of the court, an appeal was not a claim, so Part 38 did not apply: Tendring DC v AB [2024] EWCA Civ 1248. CPR PD 52A para 6.1 provided that “An appellant who does not wish to pursue an application or appeal may request the appeal court to dismiss the application or the appeal. If such a request is granted it will usually be subject to an order that the appellant pays the costs of the application or appeal” (emphasis added). By the time Mr Matthews’ request to withdraw was received, the Court of Appeal had already read into the case and formed the view that the main issue raised went to the jurisdiction of the court to make a bankruptcy order, which was potentially of general significance; and the request to withdraw had come at a late stage, so most of the costs incurred by the respondents in resisting the appeal would already have been incurred. The court decided, then, that the appeal should go ahead.
The main issue was whether the petition debt on which the bankruptcy order had been made was a liquidated sum as required by s 267(2)(b) Insolvency Act 1986. Nugee LJ explained that the effect of ss 385(1) and (3) of the Act was that “debt” was generally given a wide meaning in relation to bankruptcy and individual insolvency, but that did not mean that all debts could found a creditor’s petition: only those that are for a liquidated sum can do so.
Nugee LJ analysed the meaning of the words “liquidated sum,” first explaining why the expression gave rise to difficulty in guarantee cases:
“42. The purpose and general effect of a guarantee is very familiar and well understood. A (the creditor) lends money to B (the principal debtor). A is concerned that B might be unable to repay the debt when it is due (often, as here, because B is a small limited company), and so asks for a guarantee from C (the guarantor – often, again as here, the director and owner of B). If B is indeed unable to pay, A will look to C to pay instead.
43. Suppose A lends B £10,000 repayable in a year’s time. B’s liability to repay the £10,000 is undoubtedly both a debt and a liquidated sum. If B is an individual and does not pay, this is therefore a petitionable debt. If B cannot pay and A looks to C instead, C will be obliged to pay £10,000 to A. One might have thought that this was equally a debt in a liquidated sum and hence petitionable.
44.Unfortunately this is not the law. This is because although there is no dispute that C will be liable to pay A £10,000 if B does not, the nature of this liability depends on the way the guarantee is framed. If the guarantee is in the form that C promises to pay A if B does not, this is what has been called a ‘conditional payment’ obligation. C’s obligation is to pay the debt to A on B’s default, and this is indeed a debt in a liquidated sum and petitionable. But if the guarantee is in the form that C promises that B will pay A, this is what has been called a ‘see to it’ obligation. In this case C’s obligation is to pay A damages for breach of the obligation. Whether the guarantee takes one form or the other does not affect either the commercial effect of the guarantee – C still has to pay A when B does not – or the quantum of C’s liability – C still has to pay the £10,000 not paid by B, as that is either the amount of the debt or the measure of the damages. But it does affect the legal classification of C’s obligation, namely whether it is a liability sounding in debt or a liability sounding in damages.”
That, Nugee LJ said, was the law as settled by the House of Lords in Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331. He went on to decide that Mr Matthews’ guarantee was in the same form as Mr Moschi’s:
“The Buyer guarantees to each of the Seller and BSN the repayment of the Loans by the Company.”
“I cannot see ,” he said, “how this can be interpreted as having any different effect from the guarantee given by Mr Moschi. Here too Mr Matthews’ promise is not expressed as a conditional obligation to pay if Chip Shack does not. This could have been done quite simply, as is shown by the wording of clause 2.1 of the Crab Shack Guarantee […]. But it was not. The actual words used are, to echo what Lord Diplock said in Moschi, simple and unambiguous and contain no relevant qualification. They are a promise by Mr Matthews that Chip Shack will repay the relevant loans. The result is that if Chip Shack does not, Mr Matthews becomes liable in damages.”
It followed that the guarantee Mr Matthews had given did not give rise to a claim for a liquidated sum and could not found a bankruptcy petition.
The appeal was allowed.
For another recent decision on guarantees (although not about insolvency but limitation) see Richardson v Robertson & Ors [2026] EWHC 2286 (Ch) in which Richard Spearman KC held that, where the claimant was induced to give a guarantee by fraudulent misrepresentation, time started to run from the time when demand was made under the guarantee, not when the guarantee was executed.
This article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or a comprehensive statement of the law. Specific legal advice should always be sought in relation to individual circumstances.
Meet the team:
